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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the legal issues created by the following scenarios:  
First, a police officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation.  When 
speaking to the driver, the officer recognizes the odor of marijuana 
coming from within the vehicle.  In a state where possession of 
marijuana is a mere infraction, as opposed to a felony or misdemeanor, 
may the officer search the vehicle for the marijuana?1  Second, an 
officer sees a driver who appears to be sending a text message. In a 
state where texting and driving is an infraction offense, the officer 
stops the vehicle, but the phone is nowhere to be seen.  May the officer 
search the car to find the phone?2  Third, in a state where running a red 
light is an infraction, an officer stops a vehicle for running a red light.  
While speaking with the driver, the officer notices that the car has a 
dashboard camera.  May the officer search the car for the recording 
unit, in order to seize the video?3 
Though they involve different facts, these three scenarios all pose 
the same question of law; may an officer conduct a probable cause 
search of a vehicle for evidence of an infraction, an offense that the 
legislature has designated as less serious than even a misdemeanor?  
The answer to this question is currently unclear.  Notwithstanding the 
wealth of case law regarding the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement,4 few courts have considered how this rule applies to 
infraction violations.5 
As the hypotheticals discussed above establish, this gap in the 
case law will not last for long.  Historically, infraction offenses have 
rarely involved tangible evidence.6  Recent developments, however, 
have increased the likelihood that infractions will involve tangible 
proof.  First, the proliferation of new, advanced technologies within 
vehicles, such as GPS devices, on-board computers, and dashboard 
cameras, provides tangible evidence for virtually any infraction.7 
Second, increased legislation that regulate activities that take place 
inside vehicles, such as prohibiting the use of cellular devices while 
driving, may implicate tangible evidence such as call logs, text-
 1. See infra Part V. 
 2. See infra Part V. 
 3. See infra Part V. 
 4. See infra Part II.A–B 
 5. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part I. 
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message histories, and the cell phone itself.8  Third, some states have 
reduced the offense of possession of marijuana from a misdemeanor to 
an infraction.9  
This Comment prescribes that in most cases; a search of a vehicle 
for evidence of a mere infraction is unreasonable and violates the 
Fourth Amendment.10  It also proposes that there is one exception to 
this general rule. Specifically, the rule will not apply where both an 
infraction and a greater crime are implicated by a particular piece of 
evidence or contraband, such as how the simple possession of 
marijuana implicates that marijuana was either sold or cultivated.11 
The conclusion that a search of a vehicle based on an infraction is 
unreasonable is supported by the history of the automobile exception 
and the inherent differences between infractions and more serious 
offenses.  Section I will discuss the nature of infraction offenses and 
how they differ from misdemeanors and felonies.12  This section will 
also address the recent changes in technology and the law that increase 
the likelihood that tangible evidence contained within the vehicle will 
provide proof of an infraction.  Section II will discuss the automobile 
exception and its application by courts.13  As detailed in this portion of 
the Comment, the United States Supreme Court has prescribed a 
balancing test for ascertaining the reasonableness, and thus the 
constitutionality of searches under the automobile exception.14  The 
Court, however, has never addressed how this balancing test applies to 
the automobile exception when the offense being investigated is an 
infraction.  Section III will discuss how courts have taken an offense’s 
classification as an infraction into account when assessing the 
reasonableness of searches other than searches under the automobile 
exception.15  Section IV briefly explains that an expectation of privacy 
exists in vehicles.16  Section V sets the stage for the balancing inquiry 
by examining the analyses of the lower courts that have addressed the 
issue of searches under the automobile exception based on infraction 
violations.  Section VI then conducts an independent analysis of 
automobile exception searches based on infraction violations.  Section 
VI concludes that, with one exception, a search of a vehicle for 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. See infra Part VI. 
 11. See infra Part VI.A. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999); see also infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV.  
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evidence of a mere infraction cannot be justified under the automobile 
exception.17  Furthermore, this section concludes that the lower courts 
that have considered this issue adopted flawed reasoning in reaching 
their results.  Lastly this section will examine why some state courts 
will not have to engage in a balancing analysis to find an automobile 
exception search based on an infraction unreasonable and why a search 
based on an infraction possession of marijuana violation is never based 
solely on an infraction. 
This Comment will conclude by proposing a modified rule to 
govern the automobile exception.  Under the proposed rule, police may 
search a motor vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that the 
vehicle contains evidence or contraband related to a misdemeanor or 
felony.18 
I. THE EXISTENCE OF DISCOVERABLE EVIDENCE OF INFRACTION 
OFFENSES IS AN EMERGING ISSUE 
Few courts have considered the danger posed by permitting 
searches under the automobile exception where the only offense being 
investigated is an infraction.19 This is because changing circumstances 
have only recently caused the issue to emerge.  The proliferation of 
technology and the increased regulation of activity inside of vehicles 
has created situations where the investigation of an infraction can yield 
collectable evidence.  Similarly, as some legislatures have reclassified 
the offense of marijuana possession as an infraction, they have created 
an infraction offense which, by its nature, has collectable evidence. 
The proliferation of technology has created collectable evidence 
for many infraction violations where previously no evidence existed.  
Many modern vehicles now carry event data recorders.20 The type and 
format of data they are required to record is already regulated by 
statute21 and a federal Senate bill proposed in 2012 would have 
required that all newly manufactured vehicles carry event data 
 17. See infra Part VI. 
 18. See infra Conclusion. 
 19. The issue has been addressed by the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeals.  State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 845 
(Or. Ct. App. 2010); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 911 (Mass. 2011); People v. 
Waxler, No. A137796, 2014 WL 935470 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2014).  These cases are 
discussed in detail infra Part V. 
 20. Kashmir Hill, Hate to Break it to You, but Your Car Likely has a Black Box 
‘Spying’ on You Already, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/04/19/hate-to-break-it-to-you-but-your-car-
likely-has-a-black-box-spying-on-you-already/. 
 21. 49 C.F.R. § 563.6 (West 2014). 
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recorders.22  In a crash, these recorders register “ ‘a car’s speed, how far 
the accelerator was pressed, the engine revolutions per minute, whether 
the driver hit the brakes, whether the driver was wearing a safety belt, 
and how long it took for the airbags to deploy.’ ”23 While the owner or 
lessee of the vehicle owns the data on the recorder24 a search of that 
data could still be justified under the automobile exception.25 
Event data recorders are only one of many emerging technologies 
that have created discoverable digital evidence inside vehicles: some 
drivers install dashboard cameras in their cars,26 smart phones can 
detect if a person is speeding,27 and at least one insurance company 
will give a discount to drivers who install a GPS recorder in their car, 
which can measure speed.28  The use of these and similar devices can 
be expected to increase as technology proliferates.  Each of these 
devices has the ability to yield collectable evidence.  An event data 
recorder can show how a vehicle was operated in the moments before a 
crash, to justify an at-fault determination in an accident;29 a dashboard 
camera showing the condition of a traffic light before a vehicle entered 
an intersection could justify a red-light ticket; smart phone and GPS 
records could justify a speeding ticket. 
At the same time that technology is creating collectable evidence 
for infractions, states are increasingly regulating the conduct of drivers 
inside their vehicles.30  That regulation creates new infractions, which 
 22. S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406(a)(1) (2012).  The provisions requiring event data 
recorders were not included in the bill that was ultimately passed.  H.R. 4348, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 23. Hill, supra note 20 (quoting Willie D. Jones, The Automotive Black Box, IEEE 
SPECTRUM, (Apr. 4, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/embedded-systems/the-
automotive-black-box-data-dilemma/0. 
 24. A provision of the proposed Senate bill would have expressly stated that the owner 
or lessee owned the data.  S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406(b)(1) (2012). 
 25. A provision of the proposed Senate bill would have required a court order to 
retrieve the data without the owner’s consent.  S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406(b)(2)(A) 
(2012). 
 26. Andrew Moran, Are Dash Cams Becoming a Necessity for Drivers to Avoid 
Fraud?, DIGITAL JOURNAL (Sept. 7, 2012), http://digitaljournal.com/ 
article/332333. 
 27. Somini Sengupta, ‘Big Brother’? No, It’s Parents, N.Y. TIMES, (June 26, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/technology/software-helps-parents-monitor-their-
children-online.html?_r=0. 
 28. Ian Bush, Part 1: A Spy in Your Car, PHILADELPHIA CBS, (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2012/08/09/part-1-a-monitoring-device-in-your-car/. 
 29. In California, an officer who has been trained as a traffic collision investigator may 
cite a person involved in the collision when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that 
the person violated a provision of the vehicle code. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40600(a) (West 
2012). 
 30. See, e.g., Distracted Driving Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, 
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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by their nature have collectable evidence. These laws include 
prohibitions against everything from smoking while children are 
present,31 to limiting the maximum temple-width of the driver’s 
glasses.32  Laws requiring the use of hands-free devices for phones and 
prohibiting the use of text messaging functions while operating a 
vehicle represent another type of regulation that has been implemented 
in many states.33   The regulation of the use of cellular phones has 
created a situation where a cellular phone could be an important piece 
of evidence in the investigation of an infraction. For example, in 
California, although hands free devices are required34 and text 
messaging is prohibited,35 drivers are expressly permitted to dial 
numbers on their phone.36  In a dispute as to whether a driver was 
sending a text message or merely dialing a number, the phone itself 
would be an excellent piece of evidence, as it may prove that the driver 
violated the statute.37 
Another type of regulation undertaken by several states has 
reclassified the possession of small amounts of marijuana from a 
misdemeanor to an infraction.38 This has already caused some courts to 
question whether the same bright-line search and seizure rules that 
govern most automobile exception searches can be applied to an 
infraction possession of marijuana violation.39 
The result of this emerging technology, increased regulation, and 
decriminalization of marijuana is that it has become unclear if searches 
under the automobile exception are reasonable when they are 
undertaken to find evidence of infraction violations.  The question as to 
whether these searches are reasonable may seem trivial, given the petty 
nature of infractions. However this issue is important, because if 
searches based on infractions are permitted, the officers conducting 
those searches are likely to find evidence of other crimes.  Small 
searches often lead to big discoveries such as weapons,40 drugs,41 and 
 31. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118948 (West 2012). 
 32. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23120 (West 2012). 
 33. See Shannon L. Noder, Talking and Texting While Driving: A Look at Regulating 
Cell Phone Use Behind the Wheel, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 237 (2009). 
 34. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23123(a) (West 2012). 
 35. Id. § 23123.5(a). 
 36. Id. § 23123.5(c).  Without this provision some drivers would be unable to initiate or 
receive calls, even while using a hands free device. 
 37. Although there are likely other ways to get this information, looking at the phone 
would be an easy method. See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in 
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1. 
 38. See, e.g., S.B. 1449 (Cal. 2010), S.B. 1014 (Conn. 2011), S.B. 2253 (R.I. 2012). 
 39. See infra Part III.  
 40. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1985). 
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cell phone messages containing evidence of drug sales42 or cell phones 
containing child pornography.43  Defendants facing charges related to 
those discoveries will be eager to challenge the search of their vehicles. 
Vehicle stops are the most common type of detention conducted by 
police officers,44 and about five percent of traffic stops lead to a search 
of the driver, vehicle, or both.45  As such, even though infractions are 
not serious violations in themselves, courts will likely be forced to 
address the issue of whether or not an automobile exception search 
based on an infraction violation is reasonable. 
II. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION REQUIRES THE APPLICATION OF 
BALANCING 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment46 as 
creating a “warrant requirement.”47  Under the warrant requirement, 
searches of protected areas are “presumptively unreasonable in the 
absence of a search warrant.”48  One of the ways in which that 
presumption can be overcome is under the “automobile exception.”49 
A. The Origins of the Automobile Exception 
Many commonly refer to searches under the automobile exception 
as “Ross” searches,50 after the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Ross.51  The holding in Ross frames reasonableness as a 
balancing of two competing interests: the public interest on one side 
and the individual’s expectation of privacy on the other.52  In Ross, 
officers obtained information from an informant that Albert Ross was 
 41. See, e.g., State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 845 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
 42. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011). 
 43. Cell phones are capable of containing child pornography.  Because these images 
can be sent via text message, an officer checking a phone for text messages may come 
across those images.  See, Jan Hoffman, A Girls Nude Photo, and Altered Lives, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at A1. 
 44. Traffic Stops, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 47. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1669 (2012). 
 48. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 49. See U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808-09 (1982); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565, 566 (1991); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 309 (1999). 
 50. See Steven D. Soden, Expansion of the Automobile Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement: Police Discretion Replaces the Neutral and Detached Magistrate, 57 MO. L. 
REV. 661, 671 (1992). 
 51. U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
 52. Id. at 804. 
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selling drugs, and that Ross had drugs in his vehicle.53  After 
corroborating some of the information, the officers stopped Ross’s car 
and searched it, finding a gun, cash, and drugs.54 
The Court’s analysis began by observing that the case presented a 
conflict “between the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in 
privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement.”55  The 
court determined that waiting to obtain a warrant would have been 
impractical56 and found that the search was valid, because it was 
supported by probable cause.57  The Court stated that, “an individual’s 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if 
probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting 
contraband.”58  
While the language in Ross limited the automobile exception to 
searches for contraband,59 the exception was soon expanded to include 
searches for evidence of a crime. The Court in California v. Acevedo,60 
under facts similar to Ross,61 where police officers had reason to 
believe that Charles Acevedo had drugs inside a bag in the trunk of his 
vehicle,62 ruled that “The police may search an automobile and the 
containers within it where they have probable cause to believe 
contraband or evidence is contained.”63   
Together, Ross and Acevedo lay down a bright-line rule that police 
may search a vehicle64 they have stopped when there is probable cause 
to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence.65  The Court 
reached that rule by balancing the same interests the Court balances 
when analyzing other types of searches: an individual’s privacy interest 
 53. Id. at 801. 
 54. Id. at 801–02. 
 55. Id. at 804. 
 56. Id. at 806–07. 
 57. Id. at 808–09. 
 58. Id. at 823. 
 59. Id. 
 60. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 61. Reading the cases reveals their similarity.  The Court in Acevedo also noted the 
similarity in the facts.  Id. at 572–73. 
 62. See id. at 566–67. 
 63. Id. at 580. 
 64. While each of the cases that created the rule for probable cause vehicle searches 
require that there be a possibility the vehicle could be moved before a warrant is obtained, 
the Supreme Court set that bar low in Pennsylvania v. Labron, so that “[i]f a car is readily 
mobile and probable cause exists . . . the Fourth Amendment [will] thus permit[] police to 
search the vehicle without more.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). 
 65. See Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of Search and 
Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2 (1999). 
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against the government’s interest.66 
B. The Reasonableness of a Search Under the Automobile Exception is 
Measured by Weighing the Governmental Interest Against the 
Individual’s Expectation of Privacy 
A search must be reasonable to survive Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny.  That reasonableness requirement applies evenhandedly to all 
types of warrantless searches, including consent searches,67 inventory 
searches,68 searches incident to an arrest,69 as well as parole,70 and 
probation searches.71  Vehicle searches under the “automobile 
exception” to the warrant requirement have long been considered to be 
reasonable.72 
In a recent application of the automobile exception, Wyoming v. 
Houghton,73 the Court explicitly adopted a balancing test to determine 
whether a search under the automobile exception was reasonable.74  
The Court balanced an individual’s expectation of privacy on one side 
and the government’s interest on the other, observing that: 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.” In determining whether a 
particular governmental action violates this provision, we inquire 
first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or 
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed. 
Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search 
or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by 
 66. See supra Part II. 
 67. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  Consent searches are 
discussed at length in Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in 
The Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27 (2008). 
 68. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
 69. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  Searches incident to an arrest are 
discussed at length in George M. Dery III, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court 
Relapses into Search Incident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395 
(2011). 
 70. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846-48 (2006) (“[R]easonableness is 
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”). 
 71. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (“[T]he reasonableness of a 
search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate government interests.”).  
 72. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 566 (1991). 
 73. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
 74. The balancing test use in Houghton is the same test later used in Knights and 
Samson.  Supra notes 70–71. 
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assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.75 
The Court then described that evaluating a search and seizure 
requires a “balancing of the relative interests.”76 
The Houghton Court recognized that the interests in this balancing 
equation vary, depending on the circumstances of the search.  
Houghton held that officers with probable cause to search a car may 
search a passenger’s belongings, provided that they may contain the 
target of the search.77  The Court distinguished the search of a vehicle 
from the search of a passenger in the vehicle, because one’s person has 
a greater privacy interest than a vehicle, triggering “ ‘significantly 
heightened protection,’ ” so that a search of the passenger’s person 
would not be reasonable.78  The Court’s use of that distinction, where 
the search of a vehicle would be reasonable but the search of the person 
of a passenger in that vehicle would not, demonstrates that whether a 
search is reasonable or unreasonable can differ between searches that 
are similar on their face, but implicate different interests.  Similarly, 
automobile exception searches based on infraction violations do not 
implicate the same interests as searches based on more serious 
violations. 
The Court has not yet considered the permissibility of a search 
under the automobile exception where probable cause exists only as to 
evidence of an infraction offense.  As related below, however, the 
Court has held elsewhere that an offense’s designation as a mere 
infraction limits the investigative steps that law enforcement officers 
may take.79 
III. THERE IS A DECREASED GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN 
INFRACTIONS 
A. The Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals Have 
Recognized That There is a Decreased Governmental Interest in 
Infractions. 
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,80 instead of a vehicle search based on an 
infraction, the United States Supreme Court examined the search of a 
 75. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–300 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 76. Id. at 303. 
 77. Id. at 307. 
 78. Id. at 303. 
 79. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); infra Part III. 
 80. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 
VAN DER HOEK FINAL 8/21/2014  4:09 PM 
2014] AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION SEARCHES 803 
home, where officers were conducting a driving under the influence 
investigation.81  At the time in question, Wisconsin classified a first-
offense DUI as a civil infraction.82  The Court found that the officers’ 
entry into the defendant’s home, while conducting their investigation, 
was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.83  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court considered the governmental 
interest in an infraction violation stating: 
The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for 
driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense 
for which no imprisonment is possible. This is the best indication 
of the State’s interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can 
be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a 
decision to arrest. Given this expression of the State’s interest, a 
warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld . . . To allow a 
warrantless home entry on these facts would be to approve 
unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth 
Amendment will not sanction.84 
The Court’s focus on the difference between an infraction and a 
more serious offense demonstrates both that there is a decreased 
governmental interest in infractions and that the decreased interest is a 
factor in weighing reasonableness.85 
While Welsh dealt with the search of a home for the violation of a 
mere infraction, the New York Court of appeals addressed the search of 
a vehicle following a detention for an infraction in People v. Class.86  
In Class, police officers stopped a vehicle driven by Benigno Class 
after they observed two infractions: speeding and a broken 
windshield.87  After stopping, Class stepped out of his car and spoke 
with one of the officers.  The second officer went to the vehicle and 
opened the door to check the door jam for the vehicle identification 
number (“VIN”).88  Finding no VIN on the door jam, the officer 
reached into the vehicle and moved some papers that were obscuring 
the area of the dashboard where the VIN is located in newer model 
vehicles.89  While doing so, that officer saw the handle of a gun 
protruding from under the driver’s seat of the vehicle, and then seized 
 81. Id. at 741–43. 
 82. Id. at 747 n.6. 
 83. Id. at 753. 
 84. Id. at 754. 
 85. See supra Part III.B. 
 86. People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 (1985). 
 87. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 107–08 (1985). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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the gun.90  The opinion of the Court of Appeals focused on the 
reasonableness of a search when there was no suspicion of 
wrongdoing, other than the two infractions.91  The court found that 
“[t]he facts reveal[ed] no reason for the officer to suspect other 
criminal activity or to act to protect his own safety.  The sole predicate 
for the officer’s action here was defendant’s commission of an ordinary 
traffic infraction, an offense which, standing alone, did not justify the 
search.”92  While Class concerned a VIN,93 rather than evidence of an 
infraction or contraband amounting to an infraction, the New York 
Court of Appeals was unwilling to permit a search for such a minor 
offense.94 
Although Class was overturned by the Supreme Court in New 
York v. Class,95 the Court overturned the Court of Appeals on the 
grounds that there was no expectation of privacy in a vehicle’s VIN, 
rather than by weighing the state’s interest in pursuing the infraction 
violations.96 Since the New York Court of Appeals was applying the 
normal expectation of privacy in vehicles and not the lack of such an 
expectation in the VIN,97 the reasoning of the Court of Appeals can 
still be applied to those portions of a vehicle where an expectation of 
privacy exists. 
B. There is a Meaningful Difference Between Infractions and 
Misdemeanors 
Infractions and misdemeanors are both classifications of offenses.  
Infractions are distinguishable from misdemeanors by the 
government’s interest in identifying and prosecuting offenders,98 the 
available punishments,99 and the societal consequences outside of the 
criminal justice system associated with a conviction.100  These factors 
 90. Id. 
 91. See People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 
(1985).  There was also a question as to whether the search had really been in order to 
uncover the VIN, as the officer conducting the search never radioed in or recorded the VIN 
number.  People v. Class, 97 A.D.2d 741, 741–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), rev’d, 472 N.E.2d  
1009 (N.Y. 1984). 
 92. Class, 472 N.E.2d at 1012, rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 (1985). 
 93. Id. at 1010. 
 94. Id. at 1012. 
 95. 475 U.S. 106 (1985). 
 96. See id. at 114. 
 97. See People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012–13 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 
(1985). 
 98. See infra Part III.B. 
 99. See infra Part III.B. 
 100. See infra Part III.B. 
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are interrelated, but it is in the government interest that a distinction 
with significance can be found. 
The label of an offense as a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction 
signals the level of the government’s interest in that offense.  Labeling 
an offense as an infraction signals that the government has a reduced 
interest in prosecuting the offense, as well as the government’s desire 
to expend fewer resources policing that type of offense.101  For 
example, California demonstrated a diminished interest in unlawful 
possession of marijuana, when the Legislature enacted a bill that 
reduced possession of less than one ounce of marijuana from a 
misdemeanor to an infraction.102  That bill expressed the desire to avoid 
jury trials and to “keep[] low-level offenders out of court.”103 The 
government’s intention that offenders receive low-level treatment is 
evidence of the reduced governmental interest in those offences. 
The California Legislature is not the only entity to acknowledge a 
decreased governmental interest in infractions.  The Supreme Court, in 
Welsh v. Wisconsin,104 reached the same conclusion, finding a 
decreased governmental interest in prosecuting civil infractions.  While 
discussing the nature of an infraction, the Court explained that, the 
offense’s label as an infraction “is the best indication of the State’s 
interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily 
identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to 
arrest.”105  The government does not have the same interest in 
identifying and convicting those that commit infractions, as it does in 
identifying and convicting those that commit misdemeanors and 
felonies.106 
The decreased interest of both the government and society is also 
expressed by the authorized punishment for a particular offense 
classification.  The maximum punishment for infractions is a fine107 or 
 101. In his S.B. 1449 (Cal. 2010) signing statement, former California Governor 
Schwarzenegger wrote, “law enforcement, and the courts cannot afford to expend limited 
resources prosecuting a crime that carries the same punishment as a traffic ticket.”  Bonnie 
King, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Bill to Reduce Marijuana Penalties in California, 
SALEM-NEWS.COM, (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.salem-
news.com/articles/october012010/schwarzenegger-marijuana.php. 
 102. S.B. 1449 (Cal. 2010). 
 103. S.B. 1449 (Cal. Assembly Floor Analysis, June 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1449_cfa 
_20100625_150316_asm_floor.html. 
 104. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 105. Id. at 754. 
 106. While the ultimate decision in Welsh is distinguishable, on its facts, from a vehicle 
search, the Court’s rationale demonstrates that there is a decreased governmental interest in 
infractions. 
 107. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 3 (6th ed. 2012). 
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other punishment short of imprisonment, such as community service,108 
or a driver’s license suspension.109  The maximum punishment for 
misdemeanors varies, depending on the offense, from a monetary fine, 
to incarceration in a jail, or a combination of the two.110  Misdemeanors 
may result in imprisonment,111 while infractions may not.112 That 
imprisonment is completely unavailable as a punishment for infraction 
violations signals that the government has a lower interest in punishing 
those offenders. 
Punishments administered by the government, such as fines and 
imprisonment are not the only consequences of criminal convictions. 
Another, appreciable, difference between misdemeanors and 
infractions is the societal consequences associated with a conviction.  
The difference in the societal consequences between felonies and 
misdemeanors are sharply drawn. For example, felons cannot possess 
firearms113 and the courts permit the use of a felony conviction for 
impeachment of testimony, regardless of the offense.114 The distinction 
between misdemeanors and infractions is more subtle. For example, in 
California, infractions do not appear on a person’s criminal record, 
while misdemeanors appear for a limited time.115  That criminal record 
that follows misdemeanors can affect future events, such as 
employment or rental applications.116  As such, misdemeanor 
convictions can affect entire areas of a person’s life, while infractions 
affect only the pocket book.117  There is a lower societal interest in 
 108. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1209.5 (West 2014). 
 109. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.5 (West 2014). 
 110. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(a), at 48 (2d ed. 2003). 
 111. The line blurs when comparing a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine, such as 
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in California prior to 2011, (CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY § 11357(b) (West 2010)) with an infraction punishable only by a fine, such as 
possession of less one ounce of marijuana in California after 2011. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
§ 11357(b) (West 2014).  There, the only true difference is the label.  Both the low level 
misdemeanor and the infraction are punishable by a fine only.  Therefore, the available 
punishment is not a trait that can be used to distinguish all misdemeanors from all 
infractions.  This dilemma only arises when the available punishment for a misdemeanor is 
set as a fine by the legislature. 
 112. DRESSLER, supra note 107, at 3. 
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (West 2012). 
 114. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (2011). 
 115. Kathleen Pender, When Marijuana Possession Becomes an Infraction, 
S.F.GATE.COM (Nov. 7, 2010), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/ 
When-marijuana-possession-becomes-an-infraction-3247238.php#page-1.  Court records 
will still be locatable, if they are checked.  Id. 
 116. See Paul Bergman, Expunging or Sealing an Adult Criminal Record, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/expungement-of-criminal-records 
-basics-32641.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 117. See infra Part I. 
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holding the offender accountable and accordingly, less interest in 
convicting the offender. 
The decreased societal interest in infractions complements the 
decreased government interest.  Both are evidence of the same 
conclusion. The people and their government care less about 
infractions, because infractions are minor violations. 
IV. THERE IS AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN VEHICLES 
The existence of an expectation of privacy in a vehicle is a more 
settled point than the governmental interest in infractions.  A person 
does not have the same expectation of privacy in a vehicle as they do 
their home.118  The Supreme Court has explained that: 
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because 
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence 
or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for 
escaping public scrutiny.  It travels pubic thoroughfares where both 
its occupants and its contents are in plain view.119 
The Court has further justified the diminished expectation of 
privacy in vehicles by explaining that “the ready mobility of the 
automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests,”120 
and that the “reduced expectations of privacy derives not from the fact 
that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive 
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.”121  
While the expectation is not a defined numerical value, there is an 
expectation of privacy in vehicles.122  It is sufficient, for the purposes 
of this Comment, to recognize that while the expectation of privacy in 
a vehicle is less than in a home, some expectation of privacy in 
vehicles exists.123  That expectation remains constant in the analysis of 
searches under the automobile exception, whether the offense being 
investigated is an infraction, or a more serious offense such as a 
misdemeanor or felony. 
 118. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).  
 119. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). 
 120. Carney, 471 U.S. at 390. 
 121. Id. at 392. 
 122. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). 
 123. Gant, 556 U.S. at 345 (“Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy 
interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless 
important and deserving of constitutional protection 
 . . . .”) (citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1986); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 
113, 117 (2000)).  For an argument that cars have a greater expectation of privacy than 
currently recognized by the court, see Cecil J. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless 
Sniff Searches and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 342–
43 (2005). 
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V. LOWER COURT’S HAVE COME TO CONFLICTING CONCLUSIONS 
WHEN ANALYZING  AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION SEARCHES BASED ON 
INFRACTION VIOLATIONS 
While Class124 and Welsh125 both touch on the issue of searches 
based on infractions, neither reaches the discrete issue that is the focus 
of this Comment.  The Oregon Court of Appeals, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, and the California Court of Appeals have addressed 
the issue, in the context of marijuana possession. Those courts each 
addressed the search of a vehicle for marijuana, where possession of 
less than one ounce of marijuana was an infraction.126 
The Oregon Court of Appeals addressed a search of a vehicle for 
evidence of marijuana possession, which was an infraction in Oregon, 
in the case of State v. Smalley.127 In Smalley, an officer conducted a 
traffic stop and observed an odor of marijuana coming from the 
vehicle.128 At that time, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana 
was an infraction in Oregon129 and the officer had no reason to suspect 
that there was more than an ounce of marijuana in the vehicle.130  The 
officer conducted a search of the vehicle and found marijuana in a 
backpack placed behind a seat in the vehicle.131  The appellate court 
relied on a state supreme court decision similar to Ross, which allowed 
for searches of vehicles when an officer had “probable cause to believe 
. . . a[n] automobile, which was mobile at the time of the stop contains 
contraband or crime evidence. . . .”132 The court found that the 
language “contraband or crime evidence” was significant, because if 
the automobile exception was limited to cases where possession of the 
contraband was a crime, the words “crime evidence” would have been 
sufficient to define the limits of the exception.133  The court then 
applied the automobile exception to the infraction violation at issue, 
holding that because any amount of marijuana is contraband,134 the 
search was reasonable under the automobile exception.  The court did 
not consider any type of balancing.135 
 124. People v. Class, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 106 (1985). 
 125. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 126. See infra Part III.B. 
 127. State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
 128. Id. at 845. 
 129. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.864(3) (2009). 
 130. State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 845 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 846 (quoting State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1362 (Or. 1986)). 
 133. Id. at 848. 
 134. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 135. See State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).  The court's analysis 
of the entire case was limited to four pages and the court indicated that it felt bound by 
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In a case decided after Smalley, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
reached the opposite conclusion.  In Commonwealth v. Cruz,136 the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts suppressed crack cocaine found 
during a search.137  The court found that an officer’s investigation of 
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana did not justify a vehicle 
search under the “automobile exception.”138 In Cruz, two officers 
contacted the defendant after they observed his car parked next to a fire 
hydrant.139  The officers smelled an odor of marijuana coming from the 
vehicle.140 There was nothing to indicate that the quantity of marijuana 
was greater than one ounce and in Massachusetts, possession of less 
than once ounce of marijuana141 and stopping next to a fire hydrant142 
were infractions, distinct from criminal violations.143  The officers 
waited for the arrival of four additional officers and then instructed the 
defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, to step out of the vehicle.144  
Once out of the vehicle, the defendant admitted that he had crack 
cocaine in his pocket, which one of the officers recovered.145 In 
Massachusetts, under most circumstances, officers could not order a 
passenger out of a vehicle unless the officers had “reasonable suspicion 
(based on articulable facts) that the defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity separate from any offense of the driver,” or “to facilitate a 
search of the vehicle.”146  As such, the court considered whether the 
officers had sufficient grounds to search the vehicle under the 
automobile exception.  The court considered Smalley, but was not 
persuaded by the reasoning of the Smalley court.147 The Cruz court 
ruled that Massachusetts law required a different outcome than Smalley 
because under Massachusetts state law, warrants could not be issued to 
locate evidence of non-criminal violations148 and that there could be no 
precedent.  See id. at 845 n.1.  In State v. Kurokawa-Lasciak, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
reached the same conclusion, using the same type of analysis, on similar facts.  See State v. 
Kurokawa-Lasciak, 239 P.3d 1046 (Or. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 263 P.3d 
336 (2011). 
 136. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2011). 
 137. Id. at 914. 
 138. Id. at 913. 
 139. Id. at 902.  
 140. Id. at 903. 
 141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (West 2010). 
 142. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 903 (Mass. 2011) (citing BOSTON, 
MASS., TRAFFIC R. & REGS. art. 4, § 1(6) (2003)). 
 143. Id. at 903, 905 n.9. 
 144. Id. at 903.  
 145. Id. at 904. 
 146. Id. at 906 (citing Commonwealth v. Bostock, 880 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Mass. 2008)). 
 147. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 912. 
 148. Id. at 913. 
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exception to the warrant requirement where no warrant could have 
been obtained.149 The court’s decision was thus based only on 
Massachusetts law and the court recognized that by noting that the 
outcome might be different in other jurisdictions.150 
In People v. Waxler,151 the California First Appellate District 
similarly addressed the search of a vehicle under the automobile 
exception, where possession of a small amount of marijuana was 
classified as an infraction.152  In Waxler, a deputy searched a vehicle 
after smelling an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle and seeing 
a marijuana pipe, with burnt marijuana in the bowl, in plain view.  The 
deputy then searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine.153  The 
court applied the automobile exception rule and found that a search 
was justified, as a search for contraband.154  The Waxler court 
recognized that its conclusion, that any amount of marijuana was 
contraband and justified a search under the automobile exception, was 
similar to the conclusion reached by the Smalley court.155 Waxler then 
distinguished Cruz, because unlike in Massachusetts, in California, 
committing an infraction is a “crime” and because California law 
permitted automobile exception searches for any type of contraband.156  
Like the Smalley and Cruz courts, the Waxler court did not undertake a 
balancing analysis.157 
VI. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION CANNOT JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF A 
VEHICLE FOR EVIDENCE OF A MERE INFRACTION 
Searches based on infraction violations should be found 
unreasonable when the expectation of privacy in a vehicle is weighed 
against the state interest in infraction violations. The automobile 
exception should not be applied as a blanket rule and courts should be 
examined as a weighing of those two interests.158  The Supreme Court 
has stated that, “[i]n determining whether to grant an exception to the 
warrant requirement, courts should carefully consider the facts and 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 913 n.31 (quoting United States v. Pugh, 223 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (D. Me. 
2002)). 
 151. People v. Waxler, No. A137796, 2014 WL 935470 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2014). 
 152. Id. at *1.  
 153. Id. at *2. 
 154. Id. at *4 (discussing that marijuana is “contraband,” and may provide probable 
cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception). 
 155. Id. at *5. 
 156. Id. at *6. 
 157. See State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 846 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); Commonwealth v. 
Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 906 (Mass. 2011); Waxler, 2014 WL 935470, at *7. 
 158. See, e.g., Smalley, 225 P.3d at 846. 
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circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on the reasons 
supporting the exception rather than on any bright-line rule of general 
application,”159 and that, “[t]here is no formula for the determination of 
reasonableness.  Each case is to be decided on its own facts and 
circumstances.”160 
An examination of the circumstances that led to the creation of the 
automobile exception reveals that in Ross, Acevedo, and Houghton, the 
police officers were investigating serious drug offenses.161  In the case 
relied on by the Oregon appellate court in Smalley, police officers were 
investigation the unlawful carrying of a concealed handgun.162  
Comparing the seriousness of those offenses to the pettiness of an 
infraction violation reveals that the governmental interest in infractions 
is substantially lower than the governmental interest that existed in the 
cases that gave rise to the automobile exception. 
A court determining the reasonableness of an automobile 
exception search based on an infraction should adopt the rule that such 
searches are unreasonable and should be prohibited.  A court could 
adopt that rule without disturbing the automobile exception, which was 
created for misdemeanor and felony offenses.163  Infractions are 
different from more serious violations.  As a result, when the 
expectation of privacy is weighed on one side,164 and the governmental 
interest in an infraction is weighed on the other165 the scale tips towards 
privacy. 
This Comment does not suggest the abolition of the bright-line 
rules of Ross and Acevedo.166  It recommends a delineation of the 
grounds to which the rule applies, with infractions on one side and 
more serious offenses on the other.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules.  
Rather it recognizes that no single set of legal rules can capture the 
 159. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464 (1981), overturned by, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) 
(Brennan J., dissenting) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968); Preston v. 
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). 
 160. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). 
 161. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 801 (1982) (officers found a bag containing 
heroin); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 566–67 (1991) (a large quantity of marijuana 
had been shipped from Hawaii); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (officers 
searched a vehicle for contraband after noticing a hypodermic needle in the driver’s shirt 
pocket). 
 162. State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Or. 1986). 
 163. See supra Part II. 
 164. See supra Part IV. 
 165. See supra Part II.B. 
 166. See supra Part II.  
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ever-changing complexity of human life.”167 However, bright-light 
rules are not without their benefits.168  The Court has also recognized 
that bright-line rules can provide “a single, familiar standard. . . to 
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to 
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the 
specific circumstances they confront.”169  Prohibiting automobile 
exceptions searches based on infraction violations, but allowing those 
searches during the investigation of misdemeanors and felonies 
embraces both these principles.  It recognizes the changing 
complexities of human life that have led to the existence of 
discoverable evidence for a number of petty offenses, while still 
providing police officers with guidance on when an automobile 
exception search is permitted. 
A consideration of the potential consequences of a ruling allowing 
automobile exception searches based on infractions shows that public 
policy cannot allow such searches.  The continued introduction of new 
technology creates collectable digital evidence as well as new 
distractions for drivers that may result in new prohibitions of in-car 
conduct.170  People have a real expectation of privacy in their 
vehicles.171  That expectation would become illusory if a vehicle search 
were permitted for almost every possible violation; police would be 
justified in searching a vehicle during almost every traffic stop.  The 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle would lose its meaning and the right 
to privacy in a vehicle would erode at the same rate that technology 
expands. 
As with any rule that inhibits the ability of police to detect 
violations and enforce laws, there would be a societal cost of “letting 
guilty and possibly dangerous [people] go  
free. . . .”172 Here, when the cost of letting infraction violators go free is 
weighed against the liberty interest of the people, the scales tip in the 
favor of liberty.  “Those who would give up essential liberty, to 
purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”173  
 167. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 168. Gillespie, supra note 65, at 3. 
 169. New York v. Belton 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981), overturned by 556 U.S. 332 (2009) 
(quoting Dunaway v. New York, 443 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)). 
 170. See supra Part I. 
 171. See James A. Adams, The Supreme Court’s Improbable Justifications for 
Restriction of Citizens’ Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE 
L. REV. 833, 835 (1999). 
 172. Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009). 
 173. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, November 11, 
1755, in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963). 
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Adopting a rule that prohibited searches based on infraction violations 
would not allow red light runners and speeders to commit violations 
without fear of prosecution.  Police still have other options available 
for enforcement,174 which don’t require searches in response to minor 
offenses. 
A. Infraction Possession of Marijuana Violations Will Not Be Balanced 
at the Same Level As Other Infractions, Because Marijuana Possession 
Implicates More Serious Crimes 
While the application of balancing will lead to the conclusion that 
a search under the automobile exception is unreasonable in cases such 
as texting while driving or speeding,175 cases involving infraction 
possession of marijuana will receive different treatment.  That different 
treatment is because before infraction possession of marijuana can 
occur, either the possessor or another party must have committed a 
felony.  The marijuana in question came from somewhere and as such, 
the marijuana was either illegally cultivated or illegally sold to the 
unlawful possessor.176  In the cases of Cruz and Smalley, the courts 
reasoned that there was nothing that could lead officers to believe that 
there was more than one ounce of marijuana in the vehicle and that as 
such, the most serious offense being investigated was the infraction 
possession of marijuana.177 However, that infraction possession of 
marijuana was not the only offense implicated. The possession of 
marijuana requires a source of marijuana, meaning that the marijuana 
was either sold to, or cultivated by, the person possessing it.  As such, 
the marijuana is evidence of a felony.  Specifically, either the unlawful 
sale of,178 or unlawful cultivation of, marijuana.179 
Furthermore, possession of marijuana remains a felony under 
federal law180 and state officers are permitted to investigate and make 
 174. Traditional methods include hiding in bushes and behind billboards. In an 
interesting example, an officer in Florida dressed in a giant bunny costume to find seatbelt 
violators.  Cythia Roldan, West Palm Beach police use bunny costume to enforce seat-belt 
law, PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/traffic/west-palm-beach-police-use-bunny-
costume-to-enfo-1/nLh3B/. 
 175. See supra Part III. 
 176. It is conceivable that a person unlawfully possession marijuana may obtain it in 
some other way such as finding it.  However that does not change the analysis here, as 
officers would still have probable cause that either unlawful cultivation or unlawful 
distribution occurred. 
 177. See supra Part V. 
 178. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (West 2012). 
 179. See, e.g., id. § 11358. 
 180. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012); See also, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (finding 
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arrests for federal offenses.181 As such, the governmental interest is not 
at the level of an infraction. Instead, the governmental interest it is at 
the level of a felony because in every case, a felony must have been 
committed by someone in order for the current possessor to acquire the 
marijuana and because in every case, the possessor is committing a 
felony. Once felony crimes are implicated, Houghton can be applied 
without considering the decreased level of governmental interest in 
infractions and a search will be reasonable if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence.182  
While the law varies from state to state as to what constitutes probable 
cause that a vehicle contains marijuana,183 any marijuana would be 
evidence.  Black’s Law Dictionary,184 defines evidence as “[s]omething 
. . . that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact . . . 
.”185 Since marijuana in a vehicle tends to prove that someone is in 
possession of marijuana and that the possessor cultivated the marijuana 
or purchased the marijuana from a third party, it is evidence of those 
crimes. So long as the particular states probable cause threshold is met, 
the search will be valid.186 
B. States That Do Not Authorize Search Warrants for Infraction 
Violations May Not Reach Balancing 
Although the application of balancing should lead to the 
conclusion that a probable cause search based on an infraction violation 
is unreasonable, some states will find the search unreasonable on other 
grounds before reaching the balancing test.  They may conclude that 
there cannot be an exception to the warrant requirement where no 
warrant could possibly be obtained to search for the evidence. As such, 
they would not even begin the balancing analysis. 
In the Massachusetts Supreme Court Case Commonwealth v. 
that federal marijuana law is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, even if marijuana use 
is legal under state law)). 
 181. People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Marsh v. United States, 
29 F.2d 172, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 182. See supra Part V. 
 183. See Michael A. Sprow, Wake Up and Smell the Contraband: Why Courts that do 
not Find Probable Cause Based on Odor Alone Are Wrong, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 289 
(2000). 
 184. Black’s Law Dictionary was chosen because that was the choice of the courts in 
Cruz and Smalley, when they sought to define “contraband.”  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 
N.E.2d 899, 911 (Mass. 2011); State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
 185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (9th ed. 2009). 
 186. For an article otherwise critical of the Commonwealth v. Cruz decision, see John 
Sullivan, Reasonable Suspicion of an Unjust Conclusion: How Commonwealth v. Cruz 
Cripples Enforcement of Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 94c, § 32l, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (2012). 
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Cruz,187 the court found that because no warrant could have obtained 
under the state’s search warrant statute,188 there could be no exception 
to the warrant requirement.189 A potential flaw in that reasoning is that 
there are already several exceptions to the warrant requirement in 
situations where no warrant can be obtained.  Those situations include 
searches incident to an arrest,190 inventory searches,191 stop and frisk 
searches,192 consent searches193 and the emergency aid exception.194 
The existence of those other exceptions does not mean that the 
reasoning in Cruz is invalid, as state courts may apply more restrictive 
search and seizure requirements than those required by the Fourth 
Amendment.195  The existence of those exceptions means only that the 
unavailability of a search warrant may not be of constitutional 
significance. 
States that authorize the issuance of search warrants for infraction 
violations will not be able to follow the reasoning of Cruz.  The Cruz 
court identified Maine as such a state.196 Similarly, the California Penal 
Code allows for a search warrant to be obtained “[w]hen the property 
or things are in the possession of any person with the intent to use them 
as a means of committing a public offense. . . .”197 The California Penal 
Code defines “public offenses” as including infractions,198 so it follows 
that in California a warrant could be issued to search for items of 
evidence in infraction cases, so long as they were used as “means” of 
committing the offense. As such, courts in states such as Maine and 
California could still reach balancing, even if they followed the 
reasoning of the Cruz court. 
C. States that Do Not Classify Infractions as Crimes May Not Reach 
Balancing 
There is another way in which some courts may disallow a search 
under the automobile exception based on an infraction violation, before 
reaching balancing.  A search under the automobile exception requires 
 187. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 903 (Mass. 2011); see discussion supra 
Part V. 
 188. Id. at 912 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276 § 2B (2010)). 
 189. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 913 (Mass. 2011). 
 190. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). 
 191. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 380 (1976). 
 192. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 193. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973). 
 194. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
 195. See People v. Scott, N.E.2d 1328, 1335–39 (N.Y. 1992). 
 196. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 913 n.31 (Mass. 2011). 
 197. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524(a)(3) (West 2012). 
 198. Id. § 16. 
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that the search be for crime evidence or contraband.199  In a state where 
infractions are not considered to be “crimes” and the target of the 
search is not contraband, a search based on an infraction violation 
could not possibly locate crime evidence or contraband, related to that 
infraction. As such, a court could disallow a search before even 
beginning the balancing analysis. 
The court in Cruz reasoned that if an offense is not classified as a 
crime, a search based on that offense is unreasonable,200 and disallowed 
the search because infractions were not classified as criminal offenses 
in Massachusetts.201  In Smalley, the court was able to skirt the issue of 
the non-criminal offense classification. The court validated the search, 
reasoning that the evidence in question was marijuana, which was 
contraband. As such, the search was valid because the Oregon 
automobile exception202 allowed probable cause searches to find either 
crime evidence or contraband.203  
However, in a future case where the target of a search is neither 
crime evidence nor contraband, even the Oregon court may be forced 
to disallow a search. For example, if the search in question was for a 
cellular phone used to text while driving,204 or a dash camera video of a 
red light violation,205 that evidence would be neither crime evidence 
nor contraband.  As such, even the reasoning of the Smalley court 
would require the conclusion that the search did not fall within the 
automobile exception.206 
CONCLUSION 
The question as to whether a search based on an infraction 
violation can be justified under the automobile exception has not been 
 199. Supra Part II.A. 
 200. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910 (“Ferreting out decriminalized conduct with the same 
fervor associated with the pursuit of serious criminal conduct is n[ot] desired by the public . 
. . .”). 
 201. Id. (“Given our conclusion that G.L. c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N, has changed the status of 
possession one ounce or less of marijuana from a crime to a civil violation, without at least 
some other additional fact to bolster a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the odor of 
burnt marijuana alone cannot reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity to justify an 
exit order.”); but see People v. Waxler, No. A137796, 2014 WL 935470, at *10 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 11, 2014) (“ [P]ossession of up to an ounce of nonmedical marijuana in 
California is a ‘crime.’ ”). 
 202. The history of the Oregon “automobile exception” varies from the Supreme Court 
case history, but the rule is ultimately the same.  State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2010). 
 203. Id. 
 204. OR. VEH. CODE. § 811.507 (2). 
 205. Id. § 811.260 (7). 
 206. See supra Part V. 
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fully addressed by the courts.  It is now emerging as an issue, as 
technology becomes more pervasive, regulation becomes more 
targeted, and marijuana possession is decriminalized. As these trends 
continue, there will continue be an increase in the number of vehicle 
stops where evidence or contraband is recoverable. 
The Supreme Court decisions setting the bright-line rule currently 
used to evaluate probable cause vehicle searches all involved crimes 
classified as either felonies or misdemeanors.  However, where an 
offense is classified as an infraction, there is a meaningful difference 
between that offense and more serious offenses such as misdemeanors 
and felonies.  That difference changes the result when weighing 
reasonableness.  The decreased weight of an infraction tips the scales 
so that the government’s interest no longer outweighs the individual’s 
expectation of privacy and any search based on an infraction violation 
becomes unreasonable.  Both the application of the Court’s balancing 
test and public policy require an adjustment to the bright-line rule so 
that police may only conduct a search of a motor vehicle when there is 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence or 
contraband related to a misdemeanor or felony. 
 
